[dspring]

My name is David Spring. I wrote the article, What’s Wrong with Avalanche Courses in 1999 after a series of incidents in the NW and BC in which several folks were killed in avalanches. All had taken avalanche courses and all were wearing beacons. To my knowledge there were no live recoveries. Two of the fatalities were a couple of young kids caught in an avalanche at Snoqualmie Pass Washington which is only 30 minutes from my house. I updated this article in 2004, including a series of recent examples of highly trained folks using transceivers and being killed in avalanches. My basic conclusions remain unchanged.

Since the article was first published, versions of it have appeared in several outdoor magazines and on outdoor websites all over the world. I have received hundreds of emails from individuals sharing their own avalanche stories. Over 90 percent of the feedback has been supportive of the articles conclusions. The few negative comments I have received largely mistook the purpose of the article. The purpose of the article was to encourage Avalanche Course Instructors and participants to spend more time during basic avalanche courses on avalanche avoidance techniques and less time on avalanche rescue techniques, (such as practice transceiver searches). Avalanche avoidance skills include pre-trip terrain selection factors (such as learning to read a topographic map) and pre-trip communication and group dynamics as a means of reducing avalanche incidents.

I am not saying folks should avoid going out to the mountains. Nor am I saying that one should never use a transceiver. Simply that the literature on transceiver effectiveness in terms of saving lives is very shaky. This is particularly true here in the NW where we have a lot of slab avalanches. The statistics are compounded not only by geographical variances, but also by season, depth of burial and number of people buried. The real question is not whether anyone has been saved by a transceiver, but rather whether the number of folks saved by transceivers over and above those who would have been saved even without the transceiver (Partial Burials) exceeds those who have been killed due to making a poor decision as a result of their transceiver giving them a false sense of security. I have been studying avalanche incidents for 30 years. It is my opinion that transceivers – to the extent that they are viewed as a magic bullet- may do more harm than good. I am however encouraged by those who use them merely as a “back-up precaution” rather than as a magic bullet.

The good news is that the article has generated a lot of discussion in the past six years. Since I believe communication and group dynamics are central to reducing fatalities, I am happy about the discussion even when it misses the main purpose and message of the article. In particular, the article has been instrumental in Europe (and to a lesser extent in the US) as a catalyst to move away from Snow Pack Analysis and Judgment based Decision making and move towards Rule based Decision making. The idea is that decisions should be objectively based on the terrain, snow and weather rather than on personal judgment and experience. An example of rule-based decision making is staying off of avalanche prone slopes during periods when the avalanche hazard rating for that region is Considerable or High. The idea is that the avalanche doesn’t know you are an expert. Nor does it know you have a transceiver. I still believe that the best way to reduce fatalities is to spend more time during avalanche courses on avoidance and less time on rescue. Teaching rule based decision making is therefore a step in the right direction.

[Kees]

Of course, I have no idea about American avy courses.

But, according to this Swiss article:
http://wa.slf.ch/unfaelle/unfallstatistik-en.pdf

using a transceiver resulted in 50-50 dead or alive. That is not a great score, but a lot better then nothing. So it makes sence to do some training in order to get more proficient in using the transciever (and in learning to probe and shovel).

Now I fully agree that avoiding avalanches is the way to go, and so avalanche courses should concentrate on that aspect. How about two different courses, the avalanche course and the rescue course?

[Joe Fratianni]

This is exactly what we try to do as instructors in my area. We give courses (and also take nationally organized continuing education type training for ourselves) that clearly separates the disciplines of avalanche avoidance and then search and recovery. I do find that at times course participants, other guides and instructors, and sometimes the mountain rescue folks focus too much attention on using a transceiver and on searching at the expense of learning how to avoid getting in trouble in the first place.

[snowdynamics]

Proper Equipment Helped Skiers Survive Avalanche
The slide occurred Sunday on Jones Pass, near Empire, Colo. The three were backcountry skiing when they got buried in the avalanche. Sterling Kamisky and another skier were able to dig themselves out and used their avalanche beacons to find and rescue the third skier.
The third person, identified as John Olsen, had pelvic injuries and was airlifted to Saint Anthony Hospital but is expected to make a full recovery.

"I have no memory of really thinking," said Kamisky. "I just did what I had pounded into my head over these years."

He was able to kick a foot free so the other skier could find him. Their quick rescue work may have saved Olsen's life.

"They had beacons. They had shovels, " said Lt. Rick Albers of the Clear Creek County Sheriff's Office. "They had probe poles and they had trained in the past -- that's what saved that gentleman's life."


Need more?
_________________
www.snowdynamics.com
"Terrain suitable for the conditions."

[snowspider]

I have taken 2 seven day avalanche courses. In neither did we spend any time practising with trancievers or practising a rescue scenerio. Tranciever practice is best done on your own time. I would have never been allowed to participate or go out in the BC with these classes without a tranciever.

We never discussed rule based decision making. This approach will never fly as the standard in North America although it may be a concept for less experienced recreational skiers in the future.

[Lassen]

Thanks for joining in, David. Great stuff here.

It might be interesting to start a discussion of "rule based decision making" on another thread, or here. Any thoughts about this?

Briefly, Kees link to the swiss article is interesting. Conclusion clearly states that a ballon device is more effective at saving buried victims than a beacon is. The fact that buried victims have a 50-50 chance of surviving if they are found by a beacon is a number that we've seen a few times in this discussion. I submit that it is a number that is misleading because it is part of a very small set of conditions that might occur in backcountry travel. Still, we need more data to know something about how unlikely that scenario is. Back to Renormr's point, if you are inclined to avoid the most hazardous slopes and conditions, a beacon will not significantly reduce your risk.

Is this a fair interpretation of the data?

Snowdynamics' case is confusing: Was the victim located by beacon or by moving his foot "so other skiers could find him"?

My friend snowspider claims "rule base decision making" will never fly. Why not?

Thus far I think most posters would agree that prudence requires travelling in the BC with the mindset of making decisions and choices AS THOUGH THE BEACON WERE NOT THERE. Anyone feel more confident knowing they are wearing one? More likely to ski the sweet line of fresh snow knowing if the unlikely happened, at least your buddies would be able to find you and dig you out? How many of you would choose a different line if you didn't have a beacon?

I think this gets at the issue.

[snowspider]

[Snowman]

[Lassen]

Snowspider,

Yes, and yes. And it makes me feel more confident, more secure. That's the problem -- it shouldn't.

In fact we should proceed as though we didn't have a beacon on. When we think about skiing a suspect slope we should feel like the rock climber who climbs solo, not like the leader who doesn't plan to fall. If I climb a runout pitch I'm really trying hard not to fall. But it is not like the feeling I'd probably have if I was climbing without a rope or belay. Skiing a suspect slope with a beacon should feel like climbing WITHOUT a belay. Palm sweaty!

So, how should it feel to ski with a partner who didn't have a beacon? It should feel EXACTLY THE SAME as skiing with one who does. Like comfortable Fourth Class.

Imagine climbing with a rope that had a 50-50 chance of breaking!

But I'm more interested in why you think a Rules based decision-making model would "never fly."

[Degaine2]

David, thank you for posting.

I have read the article in the past and briefly reread it before posting. I never understood the article to discourage wearing a beacon. My understanding from the article and David’s post is that too much emphasis has (or had now 6 years after the first addition of the article) been on reaction – i.e. rescue – and not enough on prevention. The avy 1 course I took focused on choosing the right terrain based upon conditions and understanding conditions as to avoid getting caught in an avalanche altogether, in addition to a section on rescue.

It’s the age old question, do we invest in more police to react to the increasing crime rates, or do we invest in education to prevent crime altogether? In medicine, should we focus only on reacting to adverse or acute events (such as a heart attack) or make an equal effort to prevent them from happening (healthy lifestyle)?

Snowdynamics, avy gear certainly will save lives ONCE CAUGHT IN AN AVALANCHE, and is of course essential, by why not take measures not to get caught in the first place? I head into the backcountry hoping I will never need to use my avy gear.

[Gary Brill]

I doubt there is anyone here who really believes that avalanche avoidance isn't the name of the game - or more accurately risk management. That said, can anyone imagine a situation where as an instructor you hadn't taught basic transceiver skills and management of a simple rescue situation - and then had the knowledge that a student of your's had died because they couldn't use a transceiver or manage a rescue? How would that feel? Hell, that would be negligence!

It is a lot easier to say that either skiers or climbers won't sometimes be in avalanche terrain at a time when the snow is unstable than it is to guarantee that it will never happen. Human beings make mistakes.

Lassen:

[dspring]

I want to thank all of you for your comments. The analogy I like best is whether we should put more time and money on police and prisons (after the crime) or schools and teachers (prevention before the crime). There is a very limited amount of both time and money in terms of avalanche education. While some lives have been saved using transceivers, it is unknown if more lives would have been saved had more focus been placed on avoidance skills during basic avalanche education classes.

It is also not entirely clear what the survival rate is when one is buried and wearing a transceiver. A study was done by Dale Atkins a couple of years ago that concluded it was about 50 percent. However, with all due respect to Mr. Atkins, I completely disagree with the math he used to arrive at his conclusion. I have a degree in Science Education and I have taken courses in Statistical Analysis. The problem with Dale’s study was that he excluded from his data base all cases in which the victims were found weeks later rather than immediately. This exclusion made transceivers look much better than they would have looked had all fatal incidents been included. In reviewing his data base and adding back in the excluded cases, it appeared to me that transceivers were only slightly better than non-transceiver cases. Both were about in the 25 to 30 percent range. As I have already noted, the actual survival rates vary dramatically depending on region, season and depth of burial. This is therefore a very complex issue with no simple answers.

Which is why I am an advocate of Rule Based Decision making. Time and again Negative Event Feedback has caused highly trained and highly experienced leaders to make very basic mistakes that then led to avalanche fatalities. A rule based system recognizes that Experience and Judgment simply don’t count when it comes to predicting avalanches. The only thing that does count is objective rule based decisions. For example, when conditions are X, we agree that we will do Y regardless of what someone’s intuition is telling them. I believe Rule based Decision making may take longer to catch on in the US than in Europe, but we will eventually get there. It will just take us a few more fatalities. There is already a National Avalanche Education group in the US promoting this concept. They are called American Institute for Avalanche Research and Education (AIARE). They have a website that is very much worth checking out.

[snowspider]

DSPRING: If I'm with my partner or partners and they are highly skilled backcountry skiers and very good with an avalanche tranciever and they are watching me and I trigger a class 2 dry slab avalanche that doesn't take me over a cliff or into a terrain trap but that bury's me under the snow: what is the statistical chance that they will recover me alive? I ask that because it's the most likely scenerio and you're a statistics expert .

And to be honest I'm still not clear on your point when it comes to trancievers. Are you suggesting they shouldn't be carried ? (I doubt it) Are you suggesting more research money should be invested in snow science (and by whom)? Are you just suggesting that rescue practice should be minimized in relation to accident prevention in courses? (agreed). Are you suggesting that getting caught in an avalanche even with a tranciever is dangerous? (yup).

Rule Based Decision making is another thread.

[Gary Brill]

A couple of qualifiers on Rule Based decisionmaking Systems.

For the Munter, which is thus far the best known of these systems, fatalities are expected to be halved. There will still be a lot of fatalities.

The NWAC will tell you that two limitations of these systems are that the forecasts themselves have uncertainty in them, there is not yet good enough coverage, and the temporal changes that take place during a day mean that the system has to be able to deal with a dynamic situation.

No one would argue that by staying out of avalanche terrain one can't avoid avalanches, but reality will dictate that situation won't be acceptable to many humans.

I prefer the approach of DuClos and Rey which recognizes the situation (PWKL) under which decisionmaking is difficult and responds by being aware of that situation and lessening exposure when necessary. Most fatal accidents are associated with these layers. Jamieson's work seems to be heading in this direction as well. Some of his work clearly demonstrates that false stable results are almost uniformly associated with layers of facets or surface hoar. According to CAA stats, something like 90% ( I have the actual % on another computer) of fatal accidents in the past twenty years are associated with these layers. A quick review of this year's accidents in the US and Canada will show that the inability of people to adapt to a different set of expectations when these layers are present apears to be key. The DuClos and Rey study was an educational program in 2002 addressed to reduce fatalities amongst French guides. The gist is terrain is the key to safety but terrain has to be adjusted in the presence of PWKL.

[snowspider]

Agreed with everything Gary said about PWKL except I don't see anyone working on a rule based decision making scenerio associated with it. One thing to keep in mind when it comes to something like the Munter system is that it rely's on an accurate stability evaluation. In Canada the forecasted mountain areas are divided into six zones by the CAA. Each zone is as big or bigger than Switzerland. The forecast comes out every three days.