Posted: Mon Dec 20, 2004 6:22 am Post subject: Durrand controversy just won't end..
One has to wonder why a self-described friend of Reudi Beglinger would want to stir up the hornet's nest just when it appears to be mostly dying down on the web, but he sure did. This is copied from another discussion board, but since the author takes several swipes at this forum community and even telemarktips.com itself, I thought it appropriate to repost his comments here:
Tim Ryan posted December 19, 2004 09:03 PM
“Not only do pseudonyms not allow full honesty, but they are also subject to abuse; several times someone either using one of the office computers after I logged off, or that knew my password (which was s simple one at the time) posted stuff under my name, much to my frustration. Again, using real names at least reduces this kind of abuse.”
The above is a quote from Frank W. Baumann, posted on Couloir’s online discussion forum at 12:15pm, December 19, 2004. My name, my real name, is Tim Ryan. I am responsible for this post. I am very amazed that people other than Frank Baumann were posting under the name of AvaBlanche. Perhaps in light of that “fact” I will have to reconsider my opinion of Frank Baumann, but for now this post will assume everything posted under the names AvaBlanche or Frank Baumann are, in reality, the same person.
I can’t keep quiet any longer. Frank Baumann’s posts on Couloir’s website have finally brought me out of my silence. I have been tempted to post for a long time on this issue, but I have never felt that an internet forum is the proper place for a discussion this serious to take place. I have finally concluded that only one version of the story is being told, and too much damage has been done to a good man’s reputation.
I believe that Frank Baumann had not posted here at Couloir’s website until the recent hacking disaster shut down telemarktips.com for several days. It must have been a very anxious period for Frank Baumann, not seeing his name in (cyber) ink for that period of time, and so he felt he must come here to share his enlightenment with the much smaller audience at Couloir.
It was with extreme anguish that I received the news of the Durrand Glacier accident on January 20, 2003. A fond friend of mine died in that accident. I couldn’t sleep well for weeks, and I still feel sorrow and pity for the deceased’s families and friends.
It has been with extreme anguish, anxiety and anger that I have read the posts by many anonymous individuals at telemarktips.com over the last year-and-a-half which have variously slandered Ruedi Beglinger and told lies about what has happened in the aftermath of the accident.
At times I was amazed by the reckless charges thrown around on telemarktips.com. I often wondered how in the world that the most frequent posters had the time they apparently did to post so much and so often.
Now a report prepared by Frank Baumann for a private client is posted on the internet and widely publicized. This report is clearly biased against Ruedi and invites the reader to condemn him for his actions that day. I would like to refute many of the points contained in Frank Baumann’s report.
I am a friend of Ruedi’s. I have skied with him at least once a year, every year, since 1992. I estimate that I have between 90 and 100 days of backcountry skiing and snowboarding with Ruedi. I know him well, and how he approaches guiding.
Frank Baumann has never skied with Ruedi. He had never been to the Durrand Glacier area until June 2003, more than 5 months after the accident. Ruedi has skied in the area for more than 17 years. In those 17 years, even in times of highest avalanche hazard, the La Traviata couloir had never avalanched. When Frank Baumann came to investigate, Ruedi tried to introduce himself. Frank Baumann turned away from Ruedi without even shaking his hand, and presented Ruedi with his back. This silly snub makes me think that his mind had been made up before the onsite investigation even started. Ruedi offered to discuss the situation with Frank Baumann, Dick Penniman, and Peter Millar while the accident scene was right at hand. They all declined to interview Ruedi.
Furthermore, neither Dick Penniman nor Frank Baumann made any request of Selkirk Mountain Experience or Ruedi for further information on any of the facts they say are missing from the Coroner’s report. I would think that a professional investigator would ask to see those items.
I was with Ruedi the day he met with Vern Lunsford’s father, within a week of the accident. Ruedi sat down with him, showed him photographs of the area, explained his actions that day, and faced the music. He did not cover up anything, and showed great character by visiting as many of the families involved with the accident as he could. telemarktips.com published an article entitled Whitewash that was withering in its criticism of Ruedi, but it has been pulled from the site for months – why is that? I suspect that telemarktips.com was embarrassed to have published that article and therefore removed it from its website.
My first public statement about the Durrand accident is the letter that I e-mailed to the National Post of Canada in response to their article that appeared last weekend. The National Post published an edited version of my letter, and gratuitously headlined it “Mother Nature to blame for B.C. ski tragedy” I reproduce here the complete, original text of my letter:
Re: "Tragedy on a Mountain" National Post, Sat. Dec 11, 04
To the Editor:
Frank Baumann’s report on the Durrand Glacier avalanche of January 2003 is a very opinionated piece of work that includes more of an agenda than simply “to reduce avalanche deaths.” Mr. Baumann goes out of his way to find fault in every aspect of Ruedi Beglinger’s operation. Just a couple of examples include the statements that “there is no indication…of whether the guides checked the avalanche transceivers…and what, if anything was done to provide them with instructions in what to do if an avalanche occurred…”
I have skied with many different professional guides and a number of different guiding operations involving ski mountaineering or heli-skiing, both in the US and Canada. I can state without reservation that Ruedi Beglinger consistently exceeds the standards of an expert mountain guide. Every week’s holiday begins with a very comprehensive exercise in the use of avalanche beacons. The beacons are checked every day, without fail, at the beginning of each tour.
Ruedi is completely consumed with providing a safe experience for his clients. Meticulous records are kept of the season’s snowpack and analyzed every day. I have seen him perform snow stability tests in the field countless times. The tone of Mr. Baumann’s report suggests otherwise, that a cavalier attitude to snow safety was the norm at Selkirk Mountain Experience. I refute that claim, based on my experience of almost 100 days of skiing with Ruedi Beglinger over the last 13 years. I have every confidence in his abilities, while recognizing that Mother Nature can never, ever, be 100% understood.
Since that accident, I have again skied with Ruedi several times, and in fact so have my wife and two daughters. We were confident that we were as safe as we could be under Ruedi’s guidance.
Tim Ryan
Englewood, Colorado USA
Unlike the internet, letters to the editor have to be quite brief to have a hope of being published. In my letter I claim that Frank Baumann’s report is opinionated – I detail below why I believe this.
I also claim that Frank Baumann has more of an agenda than “to reduce avalanche deaths.” I believe a big part of his agenda includes the effort to see that Ruedi is punished for what Frank Baumann sees as mistakes made on that fateful day, and to take it even further: to see that Ruedi is driven out of business. Also, I believe that Frank Baumann wants to promote himself and develop a reputation as an avalanche expert.
Frank Baumann reports many indisputable facts relative to the accident - the location of the avalanche (with a DOP of less than 2.0), the elevation of the crown, the length of the avalanche, the angles involved, etc. Superficially it appears to be a very well done, professional looking document.
However, Frank Baumann reveals the true quality of the document with quite a few cheap shots. A very typical technique used throughout the report is to state something along the lines of “there was no indication that x was performed,” where x is something that would normally be performed by a professional guide. He implies that x was certainly not done. This is Frank Baumann’s opinion, and spin.
On the very first page of the Executive Summary (page 1) Frank Baumann states that nine snow profiles dug in the vicinity of the avalanche by investigators confirmed the presence of the persistent weak layer. But he does not address the reactivity of that layer. Ruedi was aware of that layer and had been tracking it through the winter. It had “healed” in the snow profiles that Ruedi conducted himself prior to the accident.
A big to-do is made in Frank Baumann’s report about the fact that the approach path to Swiss Meadows exposed itself to avalanches off the south face of Tumbledown. Time management is at play here – it is similar to wanting to be off a face in the spring by the time the early morning sun has done its work to increase the chance of an avalanche as compared to earlier in the day. There are times when it is much safer to be in an avalanche path than during the time of highest hazard.
Frank Baumann also expresses his opinion that Ruedi was careless in his approach to snow safety. The report says “it is unknown what brand of beacons were used,” and “it is unclear whether beacons were checked to see if they were operating properly” or “if any instruction was given in what to do in the event of an avalanche.” What does it matter what brand of beacons were used? I know that the beacons (Barryvox, by the way) are checked every day at SME. You can’t leave the helipad without passing by Ruedi or another guide who individually checks that everyone’s beacon is indeed transmitting. Every Saturday morning is spent at the soccer field for about two hours going over how the beacons work, what you should do in an avalanche, etc. etc. I’m sure I’m not alone among SME clients in wishing that the sessions weren’t as long as they are at times.
Frank Baumann implies that Ruedi was too far away from the avalanche to immediately realize it had happened. (Page 3 of the report, Executive Summary, paragraph (c)): “The location of the guide some distance ahead of his group. This did not allow him to track their progress and well-being, or immediately notice that a large avalanche had occurred.” Are you kidding me? I think Ruedi noticed it pretty much right away – that’s my opinion.
Another example of this insidious technique, and perhaps the most egregious, is contained in the section titled “Snowpack and other records at Durrand Chalet.” The following excerpt from the report is on page 8, Section H. Item 3:
“there is no indication in either the Coroner’s Inquiry, or Larry Stanier’s report to the Coroner, that standard snow profiles were prepared by Selkirk Mountain Experience at Durrand Chalet, or that any stability tests, such as Rutschblock tests, were done. Also, Larry Stanier did not find any standard snow profiles when he stayed at the Durrand Glacier Chalet immediately after the accident.”
I know, from talking to Ruedi, that yes indeed the standard snow profile and stability tests were performed on a regular basis, and documented in a book kept in Ruedi’s office. Ruedi showed these records to Larry Stanier (and to the other avalanche professionals involved in the investigation) when he was at the chalet immediately after the accident. Frank Baumann did not ask Ruedi for those records, and invites the reader of his report to reach the conclusion that they therefore do not exist. What kind of investigation is that? Professional?
Dick Penniman spent a week ski touring with SME after the accident. Dick Penniman’s occupation is a professional expert plaintiff’s witness in ski related cases. Dick Penniman told another client during his week of ski touring that he “was impressed with Ruedi’s professionalism in guiding.” Ruedi didn’t know who Dick Penniman was, and only recently heard of Dick Penniman’s high estimation of Ruedi’s professional abilities. Why was that not part of the recent ISSW presentation of Frank Baumann’s paper?
The simple fact of the matter is that in guided Canadian powder skiing, more than one person at a time is exposed to a slope which could potentially avalanche. I have descended the north face of Mt. Durrand three or four times during my trips to SME. Every descent has been the experience of dreams, of being in a place that I would never ever otherwise go unless guided by somebody like Ruedi. That is a slope that can avalanche. I have been on it with many people at once. We have all paid to be guided there by someone who we believe has the ability to evaluate whether or not it is safe to be there. So far, the ability of Ruedi has kept me safe in that and many other similar environments. I fully recognize that I am not 100% guaranteed that Ruedi will always be right, and that Mother Nature can be impossible to fully understand and predict. Yet the allure of temporarily visiting such a hostile, beautiful environment is too strong for me and many others to resist.
I fear that along with Frank Baumann’s presumptive intentions to educate all of us he has contributed to a steady drumbeat demanding the, metaphorical at least, lynching of Ruedi. He has aided and abetted Peter Millar’s (Max on telemarktips.com) uncontrolled ravings on their forums. For those of you who haven’t read Max’s mad posts, they include statements comparing Ruedi to a mass murderer at a McDonalds armed with a machine gun.
“I do not see why Beglinger is still guiding any more than someone who sprayed a McDonalds with machine gun fire should go free.” Posted on telemarktips.com on Tuesday, April 27, 2004 at 3:16 PM on the “Berthoud vs La Traviata” thread.
I don’t expect Frank Baumann to change his mind. I do expect him to post an equally longwinded reply to my post, repeating over and over that he has only honorable intentions in this affair. But I want people who read this forum to hear some things that they otherwise would not, and encourage them to really think hard about what has been posted both here and at telmarktips.com.
Irresponsible internet postings have a real, damaging effect on the people involved. Ruedi’s life, and that of his family, will forever be shadowed by the great tragedy of January 20, 2003. I know of no other person who works as hard as Ruedi does at providing a safe, quality experience for his clients. Since January 2003 he has made significant changes to improve the safety of his clients. These changes include: availability of ABS packs for each client; fewer numbers of skiers in each group; and participation in the InfoEx program. There are many great mountain ranges in the world in which to ski, but I strongly encourage everyone to try out Selkirk Mountain Experience at least once. Many people return again and again.
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(Ruedi) did not cover up anything, and showed great character by visiting as many of the families involved with the accident as he could. telemarktips.com published an article entitled Whitewash that was withering in its criticism of Ruedi, but it has been pulled from the site for months – why is that? I suspect that telemarktips.com was embarrassed to have published that article and therefore removed it from its website.
This is a charge that I cannot let go without a response since it is wholly without merit and lacking in an understanding of the basic facts of the article I wrote for this site, "Whitewash on Tumbledown."
First let me address the issue of the "criticism" of Ruedi Beglinger's actions that terrible day contained in "Whitewash." I did indeed raise questions about the guiding style utilized at SME, an approach that may have contributed to the accident, particularly its severity. And while I also brought up some other basic avy safety issues, all of this was tangential to the true focus of the article, which was intended as a response to Couloir publisher Craig Dostie's inaccurate and misleading apologia titled "Tragedy on Tumbledown," and also Ted Keresote's similar piece on Outside magazine.
Dostie's article contained factual errors, some of which were of great importance to anyone trying to learn from the tragedy, particularly outrageous was Craig's wildly inaccurate speculation (claimed to have been derived from a topo map) that the slope angle of the La Traviata couloir the group was climbing was thought to have been around 25 degrees, when in fact it pegged out at 37 degrees, right in the heart of the avalanche risk/slope angle danger zone. Also galling was Dostie's assertion that his estimate of 25 degrees was based on having skied with Ruedi and Dostie's personal knowledge of the kind of slopes Beglinger usually skis with clients, thereby likely making Craig the first ski writer ever to claim that Ruedi Beglinger guides clients primarily into gentle terrain. Now Craig Dostie is someone I consider to be a friend of mine, and we have talked at length about the SME disaster many times, but to this day I can't say for certain why he made those claims in his report.
Beyond the factual errors, to me there was something far more disturbing about the content of Keresote and Dostie's articles: both largely left the reader with false impression that everything that was done that day was by the book, and that the tragedy was the sad result of a horrible fluke, an act of God, if you will. This is the kind of approach we would expect to see from an author writing in the regular media, not from the leading backcountry skiing and outdoor print magazines. As David McClung and Peter Schaerer wrote in the opening pages of The Avalanche Handbook, this kind of mainstream media coverage leads many to the assumption that avalanche risk cannot be managed in a way that serves to significantly reduce the danger to inherent to winter backcountry travel. It's simply not true, and in the wake of the SME disaster, I thought it was (and still do) terribly irresponsible for the media within our sport to contribute to this false impression, especially while mangling (massaging?) the facts.
Mr. Ryan also writes that he suspects that Whitewash on Tumbledown is no longer available on Telemarktips.com because we are embarrassed by its content. This is simply not true. I am very proud that we took the stand that we did but decided, after more than a year, to take the article down after several phone conversations with Ruedi himself, and also as a result of conversations and meetings with a close, personal, mutual friend. It was removed as an act of compassion, the feeling being that the article had served its purpose and that its remaining available on the web had become more hurtful than informative. This was never my intention.
Specifically, Telemarktips.com has become a very high profile online magazine in recent years, our Google ranking (among other search engines) has climbed steadily to the point that searches for the word "telemark" result in Telemarktips coming back in the number one spot. Consequently other pages on the site get similar high rankings. It was pointed out to me that a search for Selkirk Mountain Experience would almost always return Ruedi's site first and right below would appear "Whitewash on Tumbledown." This just did not seem fair to me as, again, Ruedi was not the target of the article, though the possibility of long-term damage to his business and the resulting effect on him and his family was undeniable. This may anger some who cannot forgive him for what happened, but I believe him to be a good man who has contributed much to the sport and to the industry.
There has been a lot of dialog focusing on many of the issues raised in Whitewash on Tumbledown. Ted Keresote wrote to us a couple of times, in letters we published on the site, with responses and explanations regarding issues we took with his Outside piece. Craig Dostie has, for sometime, reportedly been planning a follow up article to set some things straight. Changes have been made at SME, as Mr. Ryan points out, changes we noted here on Telemarktips.com quite awhile back. I am not at all embarrassed by Whitewash, on the contrary, I am very proud to have taken a stand that seems to have played at least small part in getting the ball rolling. Many of us lost friends or relatives that sad day, only by learning from this awful tragedy do we honor their memory.
Joined: 21 Dec 2004 Posts: 75 Location: The slopes of Mount Analogue, of course!
Posted: Tue Dec 21, 2004 4:19 am Post subject: Durrand Stuff
Commentary provided by Peter J. Millar (PJM) formerly "max" Re Durrand stuff.
JPL wrote:
One has to wonder why a self-described friend of Reudi Beglinger would want to stir up the hornet's nest just when it appears to be mostly dying down on the web, but he sure did. This is copied from another discussion board, but since the author takes several swipes at this forum community and even telemarktips.com itself, I thought it appropriate to repost his comments here:
Tim Ryan posted December 19, 2004 09:03 PM
Tim Ryan – “I can’t keep quiet any longer. Frank Baumann’s posts on Couloir’s website have finally brought me out of my silence. I have been tempted to post for a long time on this issue, but I have never felt that an internet forum is the proper place for a discussion this serious to take place. I have finally concluded that only one version of the story is being told, and too much damage has been done to a good man’s reputation.”
PJM Commentary – I do not believe that the issue is whether Beglinger is a good or bad man, but rather why did seven people die, how can such mass burials be avoided in the future, and, indeed, whether Beglinger was acting as a competent guide.
If one side is only being presented, I would love to see the “other story” in print… again. I heard this “other story” in interview with Beglinger and his story was and still is that he did everything he could have done that day. I still believe this to be the most egregious misrepresentation of the situation: a statement that habit and presumption, and ignorance of the probable consequences of stacking people in a deadly terrain trap carry the day in the world of so-called “professional” guiding.
In our personal meeting with Beglinger he would not answer our questions directly and, indeed, he still tried to portray the event as a “natural” occurrence! This portrayal was the same that he initially presented to the world, was re-iterated in many newspapers and magazines, and was the thrust of Beglinger’s presentation in every meeting he had with other family members of the deceased. The fiction that this was a “natural” event was also, and most remarkably, repeated yet again in a letter published on a later date and penned by his wife. How long will it be before it becomes acknowledged truth: The party above collapsed a layer that set off the avalanches that killed those below.
Let’s detail the story as I understand it:
1) Beglinger had not been to Tumbledown yet that year.
2) He did no pitting in the vicinity.
3) He was aware of remarkably unusual conditions lying deep in the snowpack
4) He was aware that La Traviata was consistently windloaded but considered that to be an advantage, a supposedly “self supporting” structure… he said “like a valley on a roof”.
5) He had seen other faces slide that year that he had never before seen slide… in seventeen years.
6) He stopped at a break at the bottom of the couloir and walked about to check the snow… that constituted his investigation of local conditions taken before ascending the couloir
7) He used his ski poles as probes as he went along (the fracture face was over ten feet high in places).
He had skied other areas, before going to Tumbledown, had ski cut some areas, and done some “hasty” (read: “superficial”) pits.
9) The only full depth pitting was done adjacent to his Chalet, many kilometers away, 1600 vertical feet below, and on a completely different aspect and exposure than La Traviata presented.
10) He did not ascend the alternate route to the same ridge, a route that is neither as steep, nor is it windloaded, nor does it ascend to a rollover, nor does it present a surely deadly terrain trap at its bottom.
Tim Ryan - It was with extreme anguish that I received the news of the Durrand Glacier accident on January 20, 2003. A fond friend of mine died in that accident. I couldn’t sleep well for weeks, and I still feel sorrow and pity for the deceased’s families and friends.
It has been with extreme anguish, anxiety and anger that I have read the posts by many anonymous individuals at telemarktips.com over the last year-and-a-half which have variously slandered Ruedi Beglinger and told lies about what has happened in the aftermath of the accident.
At times I was amazed by the reckless charges thrown around on telemarktips.com. I often wondered how in the world that the most frequent posters had the time they apparently did to post so much and so often.
PJM Commentary - Mr. Ryan, I would be more than happy to go toe-to-toe with you on your accusations of lying and slander. Let’s try to be a bit more specific: What lies, actually, can you refer to? How about the commonly promulgated lie that this was a natural event? And regarding anguish, Mr. Ryan, you have no idea what it is like for the majority of family members, now do you? Are these wounds healed? Hardly, Mr. Ryan. We all were apparently hurt by this. Now why did it happen and how can we prevent it from happening again?
Tim Ryan - Now a report prepared by Frank Baumann for a private client is posted on the internet and widely publicized. This report is clearly biased against Ruedi and invites the reader to condemn him for his actions that day. I would like to refute many of the points contained in Frank Baumann’s report.
I am a friend of Ruedi’s… In …17 years, even in times of highest avalanche hazard, the La Traviata couloir had never avalanched. When Frank Baumann came to investigate, Ruedi tried to introduce himself. Frank Baumann turned away from Ruedi without even shaking his hand, and presented Ruedi with his back. Ruedi offered to discuss the situation with Frank Baumann, Dick Penniman, and Peter Millar while the accident scene was right at hand. They all declined to interview Ruedi.
PJM Commentary – La Traviata is probably a perfect feature for high stress release… exactly the condition when 21 people are in the same place. And the inevitagble release was, as demonstrated, of devastating effect.
I have no recollection of Baumann “turning his back on Beglinger or “refusing” his handshake. I do recall our pilot, when we were flying in, being contacted by the chopper below (Beglinger’s) and him being asked, sarcastically I might add, if we were there to collect “souvenirs”. Beglinger then flew up and met us at our landing site whereupon he walked over and asked us point blank if we were there “for souvenirs”. Then, when I described how we were going to analyze the site he almost hissed, “You don’t know Selkirk snow!” If I had had the presence of mind, I would have said “Well it is obvious that you don’t know Selkirk snow either”. And I might add, the truth to me seems that no one “knows” the snow… and that is a very significant point of this discussion: If we can’t “know” the snow, the why on earth would a guide ever feel it reasonable to take a huge group, closely spaced, UP a windloaded terrain trap… with only 17 years of experience to back it up, and in the presence of a clearly safer alternative route?
Beglinger did not offer information while we were at the site, nor did he offer to be interviewed. Beglinger did, on parting, warn us again against “collecting any souvenirs”. Beglinger did not appear to recognize me as one of the relatives with whom he had met previously. I was horrified at Beglinger’s preoccupation with artifacts, and his statement regarding my lack of “knowledge” of “Selkirk snow” (how snow particularly distinguishes itself in the Selkirks I do not know (perhaps it has an alternative molecular structure that only Ruedi is privy to?)) Actually, I must say Beglinger’s preoccupation with the snow, and with his presumed “command” of the snow seems to fly in the face of natural variability, the fact that it was an extraordinary el nino year, and in light of the true ascendancy of terrain in safety considerations: a deadly terrain trap is just a deadly terrain trap. Why go up one if you don’t have to… no matter how long you’ve watched it?
Tim Ryan - Furthermore, neither Dick Penniman nor Frank Baumann made any request of Selkirk Mountain Experience or Ruedi for further information on any of the facts they say are missing from the Coroner’s report. I would think that a professional investigator would ask to see those items.
PJM Commentary –
We requested all the information we could get from Beglinger and other sources. Mr. Ryan, I am wondering where you are getting this information? Is it fact? Or is it akin to those kind of “facts” such as that this was a “natural” and “unavoidable” event?
Tim Ryan - I was with Ruedi the day he met with Vern Lunsford’s father, within a week of the accident. Ruedi sat down with him, showed him photographs of the area, explained his actions that day, and faced the music. He did not cover up anything, and showed great character by visiting as many of the families involved with the accident as he could.
PJM Commentary – Beglinger did not visit my family until many, many months after the event. And ours is not the only family that felt Beglinger’s purpose in the meetings was gratuitous presentation of his assertion that the avalanches were “natural” and unavoidable, and that he had done all that any reasonable guide would have done, the sum total of which led to his assumption that the couloir was “safe”. We came away feeling that he was there to engage in “damage control”, and to further convince himself, and us, of his greatness as an “intuitive” guide. I do have empathy for Beglinger the man, but I do not believe that he did all he could, or reasonably respected the terrain trap he led his clients into.
Tim Ryan - My first public statement about the Durrand accident is the letter that I e-mailed to the National Post of Canada in response to their article that appeared last weekend. The National Post published an edited version of my letter, and gratuitously headlined it “Mother Nature to blame for B.C. ski tragedy” I reproduce here the complete, original text of my letter:
Re: "Tragedy on a Mountain" National Post, Sat. Dec 11, 04
To the Editor:
Frank Baumann’s report on the Durrand Glacier avalanche of January 2003 is a very opinionated piece of work that includes more of an agenda than simply “to reduce avalanche deaths.” Mr. Baumann goes out of his way to find fault in every aspect of Ruedi Beglinger’s operation. Just a couple of examples include the statements that “there is no indication…of whether the guides checked the avalanche transceivers…and what, if anything was done to provide them with instructions in what to do if an avalanche occurred…”
I have skied with many different professional guides and a number of different guiding operations involving ski mountaineering or heli-skiing, both in the US and Canada. I can state without reservation that Ruedi Beglinger consistently exceeds the standards of an expert mountain guide. Every week’s holiday begins with a very comprehensive exercise in the use of avalanche beacons. The beacons are checked every day, without fail, at the beginning of each tour.
PJM Commentary – Mr. Ryan, in what ways does Mr. Beglinger “exceed the standards of an expert mountain guide?” Specifically, per the model of heli guiding operations, did he send ahead any scouts to check the slope, did he do any local pitting, did he acknowledge the nature of the deadly trap he was leading his clients up? And that’s another question: “What are the standards of expert mountain guides?”
Tim Ryan - Ruedi is completely consumed with providing a safe experience for his clients. Meticulous records are kept of the season’s snowpack and analyzed every day. I have seen him perform snow stability tests in the field countless times. The tone of Mr. Baumann’s report suggests otherwise, that a cavalier attitude to snow safety was the norm at Selkirk Mountain Experience. I refute that claim, based on my experience of almost 100 days of skiing with Ruedi Beglinger over the last 13 years. I have every confidence in his abilities, while recognizing that Mother Nature can never, ever, be 100% understood.
Tim Ryan
Englewood, Colorado USA
PJM Commentary – I am pleased Mr. Ryan feels confident in Mr. Beglinger’s abilities. I’m specifically wondering, however, what kinds of snow stability tests Mr. Beglinger carries out in the field. Of course, Mr. Beglinger has his following but it should be noted that he has also had his critics from the beginning, and there has been no lack of controversy about his methods. Indeed, there have been those who predicted, accurately enough it would seem, that he would kill a whole group of clients some day.
Tim Ryan - Unlike the Internet, letters to the editor have to be quite brief to have a hope of being published. In my letter I claim that Frank Baumann’s report is opinionated – I detail below why I believe this.
I also claim that Frank Baumann has more of an agenda than “to reduce avalanche deaths.” I believe a big part of his agenda includes the effort to see that Ruedi is punished for what Frank Baumann sees as mistakes made on that fateful day, and to take it even further: to see that Ruedi is driven out of business. Also, I believe that Frank Baumann wants to promote himself and develop a reputation as an avalanche expert.
Frank Baumann reports many indisputable facts relative to the accident - the location of the avalanche (with a DOP of less than 2.0), the elevation of the crown, the length of the avalanche, the angles involved, etc. Superficially it appears to be a very well done, professional looking document.
However, Frank Baumann reveals the true quality of the document with quite a few cheap shots. A very typical technique used throughout the report is to state something along the lines of “there was no indication that x was performed,” where x is something that would normally be performed by a professional guide. He implies that x was certainly not done. This is Frank Baumann’s opinion, and spin.
On the very first page of the Executive Summary (page 1) Frank Baumann states that nine snow profiles dug in the vicinity of the avalanche by investigators confirmed the presence of the persistent weak layer. But he does not address the reactivity of that layer. Ruedi was aware of that layer and had been tracking it through the winter. It had “healed” in the snow profiles that Ruedi conducted himself prior to the accident.
PJM Commentary – To state that the weak layer was “tracked through the winter” seems to stretch the point: Specifically what was done to track the weak layer, and why did it supposedly disappear in Beglinger’s terrain when it was still very reactive elsewhere in the same range? What indeed, misled him into making a deadly decision? Again, the truth of this event is that seven people died. It is not true that Beglinger made a correct call that day. He made a wrong call. Why?
Tim Ryan - A big to-do is made in Frank Baumann’s report about the fact that the approach path to Swiss Meadows exposed itself to avalanches off the south face of Tumbledown. Time management is at play here – it is similar to wanting to be off a face in the spring by the time the early morning sun has done its work to increase the chance of an avalanche as compared to earlier in the day. There are times when it is much safer to be in an avalanche path than during the time of highest hazard.
Frank Baumann also expresses his opinion that Ruedi was careless in his approach to snow safety. The report says “it is unknown what brand of beacons were used,” and “it is unclear whether beacons were checked to see if they were operating properly” or “if any instruction was given in what to do in the event of an avalanche.” What does it matter what brand of beacons were used? I know that the beacons (Barryvox, by the way) are checked every day at SME. You can’t leave the helipad without passing by Ruedi or another guide who individually checks that everyone’s beacon is indeed transmitting. Every Saturday morning is spent at the soccer field for about two hours going over how the beacons work, what you should do in an avalanche, etc. etc. I’m sure I’m not alone among SME clients in wishing that the sessions weren’t as long as they are at times.
PJM Commentary – I agree the presentation of questions about what was and what was not done can be interpreted negatively, as spin. However, taken as statements of fact, to say it is unclear means just that, and since we could not interview the guide further… well, it was “unclear”. Perhaps Baumann could have used some more politic wording that carried absolutely no implications. Again, however, the issue here does not rest in whether Baumann has “spin” or whether Beglinger has “spin” but on what actually happened. Baumann, I am sure did the best job he could. And I think it pertinent to remember that no one would have investigated this in any degree of detail without my putting together a team to do it myself.
Tim Ryan - Frank Baumann implies that Ruedi was too far away from the avalanche to immediately realize it had happened. (Page 3 of the report, Executive Summary, paragraph (c)): “The location of the guide some distance ahead of his group. This did not allow him to track their progress and well-being, or immediately notice that a large avalanche had occurred.” Are you kidding me? I think Ruedi noticed it pretty much right away – that’s my opinion.
PJM Commentary – I have interviewed Beglinger, been to the site, and interviewed three people who were there… all three who were there said that Beglinger was pretty far ahead, seemed oblivious to what was going on, and had to be called to loudly to get his attention. Indeed, it is uncertain that he could have seen any of the avalanche action at all from his vantage point.
Tim Ryan - Another example of this insidious technique (emphasis mine, PJM) and perhaps the most egregious, is contained in the section titled “Snowpack and other records at Durrand Chalet.” The following excerpt from the report is on page 8, Section H. Item 3:
“there is no indication in either the Coroner’s Inquiry, or Larry Stanier’s report to the Coroner, that standard snow profiles were prepared by Selkirk Mountain Experience at Durrand Chalet, or that any stability tests, such as Rutschblock tests, were done. Also, Larry Stanier did not find any standard snow profiles when he stayed at the Durrand Glacier Chalet immediately after the accident.”
I know, from talking to Ruedi, that yes indeed the standard snow profile and stability tests were performed on a regular basis, and documented in a book kept in Ruedi’s office. Ruedi showed these records to Larry Stanier (and to the other avalanche professionals involved in the investigation) when he was at the chalet immediately after the accident. Frank Baumann did not ask Ruedi for those records, and invites the reader of his report to reach the conclusion that they therefore do not exist. What kind of investigation is that? Professional?
PJM Commentary – Well, neither Stanier's report nor the Coroner’s report contained any information on standard snow profiles… so I suppose one could say “it is uncertain” whether they exist? I’m sure, in many controversial arenas many points of rhetoric can be pointed to as applications of “insidious technique”.
Tim Ryan - Dick Penniman spent a week ski touring with SME after the accident. Dick Penniman’s occupation is a professional expert plaintiff’s witness in ski related cases. Dick Penniman told another client during his week of ski touring that he “was impressed with Ruedi’s professionalism in guiding.” Ruedi didn’t know who Dick Penniman was, and only recently heard of Dick Penniman’s high estimation of Ruedi’s professional abilities. Why was that not part of the recent ISSW presentation of Frank Baumann’s paper?
PJM Commentary – Well I’m just about out of steam on this because that is neither an accurate description of Penniman’s career, nor of the opinion I know him to have of his experience at SME, or more importantly, of the lessons or conclusions he came away with from visiting the Durrand avalanche site. What I wonder about is all the third party (Mr. Ryan's) information presented here as “fact”. The fact of the matter is that Penniman’s ISSW paper, as I, your humble servant understand it, was more pertaining to the fact that the TERRAIN at La Traviata was just deadly, and in light of the unknowable nature of the snowpack, completely unacceptable as an uproute of choice. But please, I’d rather refer you to the text of Penniman’s presentation or to Penniman himself. I certainly do not want to do his talking for him.
Tim Ryan - The simple fact of the matter is that in guided Canadian powder skiing, more than one person at a time is exposed to a slope which could potentially avalanche. I have descended (emphasis mine, PJM) the north face of Mt. Durrand three or four times during my trips to SME. Every descent has been the experience of dreams, of being in a place that I would never ever otherwise go unless guided by somebody like Ruedi. That is a slope that can avalanche. I have been on it with many people at once. We have all paid to be guided there by someone who we believe has the ability to evaluate whether or not it is safe to be there. So far, the ability of Ruedi has kept me safe in that and many other similar environments. I fully recognize that I am not 100% guaranteed that Ruedi will always be right, and that Mother Nature can be impossible to fully understand and predict. Yet the allure of temporarily visiting such a hostile, beautiful environment is too strong for me and many others to resist.
PJM Commentary – I have to ask, “How is the face on Mt. Durrand similar to La Traviata? Is the face a windloaded 37 degrees, rolling over to a consistently wind-scoured slope? Does it funnel down to a flat terrain trap? Are all skiers on the face contained in a convex gully in a strip about 60 yards wide? Mr. Ryan, is this your version of an insidious technique?
Tim Ryan - I fear that along with Frank Baumann’s presumptive intentions to educate all of us he has contributed to a steady drumbeat demanding the, metaphorical at least, lynching of Ruedi. He has aided and abetted Peter Millar’s (Max on telemarktips.com) uncontrolled ravings on their forums. For those of you who haven’t read Max’s mad posts, they include statements comparing Ruedi to a mass murderer at a McDonalds armed with a machine gun.
“I do not see why Beglinger is still guiding any more than someone who sprayed a McDonalds with machine gun fire should go free.” Posted on telemarktips.com on Tuesday, April 27, 2004 at 3:16 PM on the “Berthoud vs La Traviata” thread.
PJM Commentary – I have been provocative in my posts on Ttips. I felt it needed to be done that way. That is a role I willingly took on but do not embrace.
I stand by my comparison of Beglinger to the Mickeedees shooter… the results are the same. In the sense that Beglinger’s “premeditation” was habitual and presumptive instead of a direct, impulsive wish to kill there is a big difference. But the lessons remain:
Terrain speaks first,
Nature speaks always
And if you want to keep people alive
You do not presume to know
You act as if you do not know
And this, Beglinger did not do.
Tim Ryan -
Irresponsible Internet postings have a real, damaging effect on the people involved. Ruedi’s life, and that of his family, will forever be shadowed by the great tragedy of January 20, 2003. I know of no other person who works as hard as Ruedi does at providing a safe, quality experience for his clients. Since January 2003 he has made significant changes to improve the safety of his clients. These changes include: availability of ABS packs for each client; fewer numbers of skiers in each group; and participation in the InfoEx program. There are many great mountain ranges in the world in which to ski, but I strongly encourage everyone to try out Selkirk Mountain Experience at least once. Many people return again and again.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PJM Commentary –
Surely this is a tragedy for many including Beglinger. I have empathy for him as a man, as I have empathy for all men (and women). However, I do not feel that a guide gets to have a “freebie” even if he is a nice guy or has put in a lot of days on the mountain. The shortcuts taken, and miscalculations made leading to the death of seven, especially the practice of overconfidence, the denial of the extreme importance of risk-based terrain evaluation, and, finally, the practiced misrepresentation of all events as “natural” and “unavoidable” are things that I believe the industry should at least make strong moves toward preventing or remedying in the future.
It is my belief that the terrain of La Traviata should be enough to say to any truly competent guide “You should never take a group up this feature… it will avalanche some day and you will kill people”.
The problem is, we need to have the humility to override our presumptions about what we think we know about the snow in order to decide to not risk other’s lives in such terrain features. And that takes guts. Like the man (Munter) said, “You must first change the guides”.
Hopefully lessons learned from that tragic event will never go away.
I believe the lessons I learned from following the discussions about this tragic event on this site would not have been learned had the incident been 'white-washed' over and only entered into my consciousness as some small blurb of a paragraph in a news paper.
Thank you Peter for never losing your focus in making sure lessons were learned.
Quote:
The problem is, we need to have the humility to override our presumptions about what we think we know about the snow in order to decide to not risk other’s lives in such terrain features. And that takes guts.
Humility does take guts, it would seem that some think humility is a weakness. I doubt anyone who sees humility as such will ever truly understand themselves nor have a clear picture of how others perceive them.
Posted: Tue Dec 21, 2004 9:00 am Post subject: Re: Durrand Stuff
Thanks for your detailed response Peter. I just have one comment on the following quote
PeterMillar wrote:
It is my belief that the terrain of La Traviata should be enough to say to any truly competent guide “You should never take a group up this feature… it will avalanche some day and you will kill people”.
This is over generalising. Obviously you believed the slope to be stable when you, Dick Penniman and Frank Baumann were all walking around on the slope to analyse it. There are times when the slope can be skied safely ...
Joined: 21 Dec 2004 Posts: 75 Location: The slopes of Mount Analogue, of course!
Posted: Tue Dec 21, 2004 3:49 pm Post subject: Re: Durrand Stuff
frank wrote:
Thanks for your detailed response Peter. I just have one comment on the following quote
PeterMillar wrote:
It is my belief that the terrain of La Traviata should be enough to say to any truly competent guide “You should never take a group up this feature… it will avalanche some day and you will kill people”.
This is over generalising. Obviously you believed the slope to be stable when you, Dick Penniman and Frank Baumann were all walking around on the slope to analyse it. There are times when the slope can be skied safely ...
Indeed, I was over generalizing. However, the point remains that the terrain at La Traviata is an extreme example of a very, very bad calculated risk... where the consequences of release are almost certainly deadly. We evaluated the risk and did not travel in a large group together. We were there during spring conditions since a weather window did not materialise, and I was unable to put together our group before that time.
La Traviata is a wind loaded terrain trap at optimum angle for avalanche. It leads to a rollover to a wind-scoured bench (at about 28 degrees, I believe it is). That data alone should make travel up such a Terrain feature a remarkably rare event. A proposal to travel up La Traviata is certainly one that warrants extreme care and respect for the probable consequences of release. Traveling up La Traviata, en masse in winter conditions is simply a fool's mission... a roll of the dice. And as proven, when the slope released many people were buried so deeply as to beg the question of whether they could ever have been gotten out alive.
Travelling one by one as is commonly suggested , or, even better, taking the alternate route to the same ridge (we hiked and skied this alternate route and estimate it might have taken from five to ten minutes longer to get to the top).
I do not agree that it would ever be safe to travel up La Traviata in winter with a large group, closely spaced together. Nor would it be safe to ski down it en-masse. Both of those approaches violate common rules of safe travel that are not trumped by the span of one man's career and his supposed knowledge of the snow. We cannot know the snow! We should look at the terrain and consequences first and then manage our groups accordingly. I do not believe that 17 years of observation is enough to justify making a habitual bad-odds/deadly consequence gamble while acting as a professional. Seventeen years sounds like a long time but it is not when nature speaks.
What has to be kept in mind here is that seven people died. Now, was it necessary or reasonable that these seven died while following this guide? Was it reasonable, and would it now be considered reasonable, for a professional guide to take a large group up such a feature, enexamined. All Mr. Beglinger had to do was spend a little more time, slow down a bit, send scouts ahead, and/or approach the feature from above as, I think would be commonly accepted practice... then these people would be alive. And that, I think is the job of a committed professional. To truly work to keep people alive and that means being humble (assuming you do not know, year after year) and smart. And no, it does not mean staying in the lodge.
Thank you for your good comment, Frank. Could I have one of those beers, now?
Regarding the comments about lawsuits: These are pretty cynnical and shallow, guys. Telemike: how about you light up your big Alaskan fattie and chill?? I do remember you being fully into examining the glint off the nailheads and examining the woodgrain while working for me some years ago...
I have not focused on this because I wanted to submit this to lawsuit. Think of this: the media and even the guide (who comes to meet with you) paint it as a natural and unavoidable event. They made every effort to do this. Let's see: one group on top oif the other in a windloaded terrain trap. Top group sets off release that kills members of both parties... that does not sound too "natural" or "unavoidable" to me!
I will never forget riding on the bus from Whistler to Vancouver with my wife after we heard that Kathy had been killed: media were all touting how great Beglinger was but my wife said it simply, "I bet he put one group above the other and the top group set off an avalanche". She was right.
Joined: 06 Dec 2004 Posts: 268 Location: Beautiful British Columbia
Posted: Tue Dec 21, 2004 4:30 pm Post subject:
Let me ask one simple question:
Would a trainee-guide taking a UIAGM/ACMG Guide's certification course pass if he took a group of clients up the La Traviata couloir as was done on January 20, 2003?
If this ever went to court, I would like to see how many expert witnesses would unequivocally answer "yes" to this question.
------------------------------
I am going to limit how much time I use responding to this type of thread; I think my time is much better spent on discussions more directly to do with avalanche safety and technical avalanche matters. I would suggest others do the same.
Finally, I throw out this dare:
I challenge any group of 21 professional avalanche workers to go up to Durrand under similar conditions to those that existed on January 20, 2003, and to ascend the La Traviata couloir, as the group on that day did. _________________ There are no easy solutions, only intelligent choices
Joined: 06 Dec 2004 Posts: 268 Location: Beautiful British Columbia
Posted: Tue Dec 21, 2004 4:42 pm Post subject:
And let me make one more bold public statement:
If this goes to court, and I am asked to be an expert witness, I will donate every penny I make to avalanche safety organizations and efforts.
I reserve the right to hold back just a little so that we can have a small party, buy a round, and salute the magnificient efforts that both Mitch Weber and now Craig Dostie are making to stay the course and help spread the message of avalanche safety. _________________ There are no easy solutions, only intelligent choices
Joined: 06 Dec 2004 Posts: 536 Location: Squamish, BC
Posted: Tue Dec 21, 2004 5:04 pm Post subject: Re: Durrand Stuff
PeterMillar wrote:
I will never forget riding on the bus from Whistler to Vancouver with my wife after we heard that Kathy had been killed: media were all touting how great Beglinger was but my wife said it simply, "I bet he put one group above the other and the top group set off an avalanche". She was right.
Didn't we learn to not do that in avy 101???
I was at the recent Canadian Avalanche Association seminar in Vancouver and listened to an excellent presentation by Bruce Tremper of the Utah Avalanche Centre. One of the points he stressed was to NEVER EVER travel above your partner as doing so amounts to murder (Tremper's words). This is and always has been one of the cardinal rules of backcountry skiing. _________________ We need wilderness because we are wild animals. Every man needs a place where he can go to go crazy in peace.
- Edward Abbey
I think it's important to note that avalanche stuff plays a small part, but critical role in the overall abilities of a guide. There is much, much more that is done in regards to client safety and satisfaction that has nothing to do with avalanches and everything to do with skiing. This is not to undermine the needs to stay out of avalanches. I can think of many more things that can hurt or kill clients during a day of skiing that have nothing to do with avalanches. There is a bigger picture here in regards to BC guiding.
Avalanche experts naturally tend to focus on avalanches exclusively as THE issue in regards to BC and heliskiing. You will not find them investigating a guided skier who skied into a tree without a helmet. Or a skier who fell in crevasse and was rescued. Or falls in creek when the snowbridge collapses. Or didn;t bring enough food and water for a long day......Or a guide who puts a client on snow they cannot ski, so they fall and fall and get injured. BTW this I rate as the most dangerous situation in BC guiding. Stresses me out more than slides.........it goes on and on... the potential for chaos.
Not sure I agree with never have more than one skier on a slope capable of sliding. I prefer to have some flexibility, though rare. There is such a thing as obvious stability. Certainly the group size is the most critical factor and why I fully endorse that BC groups (guided or recreational) not excede 4. This incident along with others over the years. support this critical change to commercial guiding in avalanche terrain. No more herds.
Regarding the comments about lawsuits: These are pretty cynnical and shallow, guys. Telemike: how about you light up your big Alaskan fattie and chill?? I do remember you being fully into examining the glint off the nailheads and examining the woodgrain while working for me some years ago...
not sure what any of that has to do with any of this, but...I seem to remember you had an anger management problem. Thrown any framing hammers lately? Go take another Prozac
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He had skied other areas, before going to Tumbledown, had ski cut some areas, and done some “hasty” (read: “superficial”) pits.
